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Abstract
Autonomous agents in computer simulations do not have the usual mechanisms to acquire information as do their
human counterparts. In many such simulations, it is not desirable that the agent have access to complete and correct
information about its environment. We examine how imperfection in available information may be simulated in the
case of autonomous agents. We determine probabilistically what the agent may detect, through hypothetical sensors,
in a given situation. These detections are combined with the agent's knowledge base to infer observations and
beliefs. Inherent in this task is a degree of uncertainty in choosing the most appropriate observation or belief. We
describe and compare two approaches -a numerical approach and one based on defeasible logic -for simulating an
appropriate belief in light of conflicting detection values at a given point in time. We discuss the application of this
technique to autonomous forces in combat simulation systems.
Keywords: Belief simulation: Belief generation: Autonomous agent: Distributed interactive simulation; Belief
revision; Defeasible reasoning
1. Introduction
Autonomous agents (or, intelligent agents
Genesereth, Nilsson, 1987) are computer repre-
sentations of real-world entities (e.g., humans)
that can govern their own behaviour. They moni-
tor their world. anticipate the consequences of
their actions or of actions of other agents, and
determine their own plan of action. Autonomous
agents are beginning to appear in computer simu-
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lation models, which are an important aspect of
decision support technology. For example, imag-
ine a simulation of a bank in which customers,
instead of being points in a probability distribu-
tion, were computer programs capable of making
their own decisions in the simulated world. For
many such applications, we argue, the usefulness
of the simulation as a decision support tool would
be enhanced if the agents' belief processes were
also simulated, i.e., they were based on realistic
observation and detection capabilities which of-
ten may lead to incomplete and imperfect knowl-
edge about the simulated world. In this paper, we
present an approach to belief simulation that
introduces, in a systematic way, imperfection in
information made available to autonomous
agents.
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Our work is significantly different from, but
complements, current research on autonomous
agents which has emphasized representation of,
and reasoning with, an agent's beliefs but has
largely ignored the question of how an agent
develops these beliefs. There are several schemes
for representing all sorts of meaningful informa-
tion (including "common-sense knowledge") per-
tinent to the agent's world, and there are various
techniques for reasoning with information -even
when it may be imperfect or incomplete (see e.g.,
Pearl, 1988, Sanchez, Zadeh. 1987). Such repre-
sentation and reasoning capabilities endow au-
tonomous agents with "human-like intelligence."
But, in simulation systems that are used as off-line
training aids for real life decision making, it is
equally important to get realism in the agent's
observation and detection capabilities.
For example, in battlefield combat, decisions
are often made because of imperfect information:
e.g., in the extreme case, "friendly fire" can re-
sult from incorrect classification of an observed
force or from an inaccurate belief of the location
of a friendly force. In a computer simulation, an
autonomous agent must receive its input through
other computer programs or external sources; it
has no sensors of its own to acquire information.
If that is the case, and if it is desired that the
agent not receive perfect knowledge, how exactly
are the agent's beliefs to be determined? This is
the question we seek to answer in this paper.
Our research is conducted in the context of
autonomous agents in a combat simulation sys-
tem. Specifically, we have implemented and tested
our ideas on the NPSNET (Zyda, Pratt, 1991,
Zyda et al., 1991) system. Military combat simula-
tion systems are used to improve real-time deci-
sion making, train personnel, and analyze strate-
gies, tactics and doctrines, through off-line simu-
lations of battlefield combat. The r6le of au-
tonomous forces (called "computer-generated
forces") in these systems is to "populate" the
world with an intelligent and ever-present oppo-
nent, creating a realistic and stressful environ-
ment for human players. Many such applications
have been created, the most successful being
ModSAF (Modular Semi-Automated Forces) and
TacAir-SOAR (Tactical Air SOAR). See Cera-
nowicz, 1994a, Rosenbloom et al., 1993, Rosen-
bloom et al., 1994 for a discussion of these sys-
tems. The "simulator" -a component which acts
as a monitor and referee -has complete access to
facts about all the forces (human-controlled, or
automated), battlefield terrain, communications,
and other relevant factors. For effective training,
it is not desirable that the simulator provide this
same perfect information to the autonomous
forces.
In the rest of the paper, we present our ideas
in significant detail. In Framework, we propose a
general framework for developing simulated be-
liefs for autonomous agents. We suggest concep-
tualizing the agent's activities in terms of three
main steps: detection, measurement, and inter-
pretation. The first two steps are concerned with
acquiring and processing data in the environ-
ment, and are the focus of our paper. In our
original implementation of this model, the third
step, interpretation, was performed by the deci-
sion-making processes of the agent, which were
separate from those processes that simulated
agent beliefs. An overview of the agent's deci-
sion-making processes is given in Pratt et al.,
1994. In Observation, we describe the features
relevant to detection and measurement in the
context of our application, that is, autonomous
agents in combat simulation. We propose, in Be-
lief-Generation, a general method for generating
an agent's beliefs. We desire that the outcome,
the beliefs, be influenced by evidence that is
available and relevant to the task at hand. There-
fore, all relevant pieces of evidence are consid-
ered and combined in making the final measure-
ment. There are multiple ways to do so, and we
discuss and compare two approaches -a numeri-
cal and a logical method -in Comparison. Finally,
we conclude with some directions for future re-
search.
2. Autonomous agents and belief systems frame-
work
An autonomous agent's decisions and plans
are influenced by the information it receives about
the world in which it is operating. It is useful to
classify this information into true knowledge about
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the world and the beliefs that an intelligent agent
forms about this world. A common distinction
between knowledge and belief is that knowledge
is simply that which is true in the world, while
beliefs are an agent's understanding about the
world Genesereth, Nilsson, 1987. Therefore, an
agent can believe something that is false, but it
cannot know that something is, for example, true,
when in fact that thing is not true.
The distinction between knowledge and belief
is important in modelling the dynamic aspects of
the agent's operating environment. We can as-
sume that the agent has a knowledge base I -a
mostly static collection of facts acquired from
various sources -but it must also continuously
form beliefs B(t) about the current state of its
environment. In combat simulation, an au-
tonomous agent's knowledge base is analogous to
terrain maps, equipment manuals, and other such
static information. It must form beliefs, however,
about dynamic factors such as the enemy's posi-
tion and intentions. Of course, beliefs can be
represented in many ways, such as sentences in a
logical language in much the same way as knowl-
edge. Several "nonstandard" logics have been
developed for representing and reasoning with
both knowledge and beliefs. For the purposes of
our paper, however, the choice of logic is unim-
portant. For simplicity, we assume a standard
first-order logic language.
Formation of beliefs and making decisions
based on reasoning with those beliefs are concep-
tually, and often physically as well, two separate
functions. In a military environment, for example,
observers form the "eyes and ears" of the com-
mander, who must make decisions based on re-
ports from many observers and many other non-
human sources. Our aim here is to develop an
appropriate method for deriving the input to the
decision-making processes of an autonomous
agent in a computer simulation. Since we are
interested in simulating the agent's belief system,
we characterize this process as belief simulation.
2.1. The role of belief simulation in agent reasoning
Our belief simulation model is "outside" of
the agent in the sense that it is a force that acts
upon the agent by filtering its information. Our
purpose in doing so is to answer the question
"What should the agent believe in a given situa-
tion?" We argue that any reasoning entity is
continuously performing three essential functions
in an environment: detection, measurement, and
interpretation. The detection activity involves the
primitive senses, both natural and mechanical. It
is concerned with the acquisition of stimuli,
whether it be visual, aural, physical, etc. The
measurement activity involves classifying, naming,
identifying, locating and determining magnitude.
This process answers such questions as "What is
that sound?" or, "What is that object in the
distance?" Measurement processes may use in-
duction, deduction, or other forms of logic to
accomplish their tasks. Finally, interpretation is
forming conclusions and, possibly, making plans
in response to the perceived object or its per-
ceived behaviour.
During the detection, measurement and inter-
pretation activities in both humans and au-
tonomous agents, error can occur at many junc-
tures. For example, detections may be faulty,
either through sensing error or noise in the envi-
ronment. Faulty detections may adversely affect
both of the other processes. Measurement may
be faulty due to incomplete knowledge, incorrect
matching of stimuli with known patterns, or in-
correct application of rules. Of course, measure-
ment will also suffer when detections are faulty.
Furthermore, faulty measurements may adversely
affect interpretation. Interpretation error can also
occur through either an incomplete rule base, an
inability to assess the situation, an inability to
choose the correct action or a combination of
these and other factors. This is the most subjec-
tive of the three activities, and may be extremely
sensitive to faulty information from the processes
of detection and measurement.
Given the preceding discussion, we can now
elaborate on a point made earlier about au-
tonomous agents in a computer simulation. There
is no requirement for such agents to perform
detection and measurement processes. These
agents can, if the application developer desires,
perform their interpretation functions with the
benefit of perfect knowledge about their environ-
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output of hypothetical sensors possessed by the
agent -is chosen by sampling this distribution.
Let ¢(t) denote the collection of all of the agent's
detection values at time t. Then, for some suit-
ably chosen function m, we can compute ¢(t) as
•P(t) = n(o(t),61(t),b) (1)
An agent may be able to directly detect certain
attributes based on its sensors. For other at-
tributes, it may only be possible to determine
them indirectly based on knowledge about other
attributes. Let P(t) represent the collection of
these "indirect observations." In our model, W(t)
is determined via logical inference by combining
the direct observations, ¢(t), with the agent's
knowledge base, A, as shown below.
(2)IP )U" - IP(t)
Fig. 1. Summary of the belief simulation model. Note that the
"indirect observations" (tr) are imbedded in the process
labeled evidence combination rules.
ments. This is how many autonomous agent ap-
plications are designed.
The framework we have discussed allows us to
place the belief simulation model, described in
this paper, into perspective. It is a means of
simulating the detection and measurement pro-
cess of an autonomous agent. We call it a belief
simulator because its output can be characterized
as beliefs, as opposed to knowledge.
2.2. Belief generation: model ot ertiew
Our method for generating beliefs is depicted
in Fig. 1 and summarized as follows. Let N(t)
denote the true state of the agent's environment
at time t. Let a denote the agent's knowledge
base, and let BMt) denote the agent's beliefs
about the environment at time t. Based on a)
environmental conditions 0(t), and b) the agent's
apparatus 6 for acquiring information, we first
compute a probability distribution for the "de-
tected value," or "sensed value," of each observ-
able attribute a that is relevant at time t.
The agent's detection -which represents the
Finally, due to this inferential process, an agent
may perhaps have multiple observations (direct
or indirect) relevant to a given attribute. If at a
given time, an agent has only one observation and
no prior beliefs relevant to an attribute, that
observation becomes its belief at that time. Oth-
erwise, if the agent has evidence favouring multi-
ple values for an attribute observation (from mul-
tiple sources, multiple observations, or multiple
inferences), the individual values are combined,
using a set of rules y, to get a final observation,
F(t), at that time.
(3)
Finally, the agent's belief system B(t) at time t
must be based on its observation at time t com-
bined, using rules, r with the agent's prior be-
liefs. Due to the recursive nature of this defini-
tion, we can assume that all prior beliefs were
summarized in the previous beliefs B(t - 1).
Thus, the agent's belief system at time t is ob-
tained as indicated below.
F(t) UB(t- 1) F- B(t) (4)
There are, however, many ways in which multi-
ple pieces of evidence leading to different conclu-
sions may be combined. Each could potentially
cause the agent to behave in a different manner.
That is, we have many choices for the set y.
Similarly, there are many ways to formulate the
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rules r, candidates being Bayesian methods and
weighted combinations of beliefs. A purpose in
this paper is to describe and evaluate alternative
formulations and applications of y. Specifically,
we compare a numerical approach, based on the
Dempster-Shafer evidence combination rule
(Gordon, Shortliffe, 1984), and a logical ap-
proach, based on defeasible reasoning (Nute,
1990, Nute, 1992). Other possibilities include path
analysis Roehrig, 1995 and Bayesian methods
Pearl, 1988. In the numerical approach. evidence
values are combined mathematically in order to
determine cardinal values of belief in each
"plausible" conclusion. In the logical approach, a
collection of defeasible rules represents the
agent's mechanisms for forming beliefs from ob-
servations, and meta-level strategies determine
which rules best apply in the given circumstances.
The calculus of defeasible reasoning is employed
to determine the most plausible solution. We
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the two
approaches and illustrate both with a simulation.
3. Modelling observation in autonomous agents
In this section we expand on the model pre-
sented in Overview. We start by covering prelimi-
nary information that must be presented in order
to properly explain how the model is used to
generate beliefs in Belief-Generation. To illus-
trate as we go along, we will use a simple sce-
narto.
Battlefield scenario Our simulated battlefield
has three kinds of moving objects: tanks, trucks
and armoured personnel carriers (APCs). The
vehicles are divided into two armies: the Ar-
gives and the Trojans. 2 Our autonomous
agent, Ajax, is an Argive tank. Trojan vehicles
are denoted by a T, Argives by an A. Tanks
are denoted by a l. APCs by a 2, and trucks by
a 3. Thus, Ajax is an Al. Ajax is aware that
tanks, trucks and APCs exist in his world, but
2 With due apologies to Homer Homer. 1969.
Table I
Observable attributes and values. The values for eeh-name
are nomenclatures for specific models of combat vehicles.
Thermal signature is the heat from a vehicle which reveals its
general shape and other identifying characteristics
Attribute Allowed values
location AXY) co-ordinate values
speed 0 .max speed of vehicle
veh-name TI, T2, T3, Al, A2, A3
veh-type tank, APC, truck
friend yes, no




does not know exactly when they will be pre-
sent and where they arc located. Ajax's mis-
sion is to locate, correctly identify, and destroy
all of the Trojan combat vehicles, i.e., Trojan
tanks and APCs (TIs, and T2s). Due to ammu-
nition constraints, Ajax generally avoids firing
on trucks. For now, Ajax is the only au-
tonomous agent on the simulated battlefield;
all other vehicles are controlled by human
operators of the simulation system.
3. 1. A classification of attributes
The first step is to determine what attributes
and events are of interest to the autonomous
agent. In our scenario, the agent, or a human
player, is able to directly observe or detect the
vehicle characteristics listed in Table 1. In addi-
tion. the agent may be interested in certain other
characteristics (e.g., amount of ammunition avail-
able to an enemy tank) that may be defined in the
simulation system but which are not "observable"
through any ordinary means.
For reasons that will become clear as we go
along, we find it useful to classify these attributes
according to the types of values they can have.
Certain attributes are continuous-valued (e.g.,
speed) while others are discrete-valued (e.g., has-
armour). This distinction influences how imper-
fection is introduced into the simulation of a
belief. The fact that has-armour has only two
choices, yes or no, means that the choice of which
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one to select as the simulated belief must be
made much more carefully than when choosing a
belief for speed, which has a range of floating-
point values.
3.2. Knowledge, belief and performance
The next step is to identify the scope of the
agent's world knowledge. For our simulated bat-
tlefield environment, permanent knowledge about
the world is included in Ajax's static knowledge
base, A. This is consistent with the knowledge
possessed by a human soldier on a battlefield. In
addition, a soldier would have common-sense
knowledge about things on a battlefield. For ex-
ample, tanks and APCs are made of armour,
while trucks are not. He also knows that an
enemy tank is more threatening than an enemy
truck, because a tank possesses a main gun that
fires a large calibre round over great distances.
We grant Ajax the same degree of prior knowl-
edge and commonsense knowledge as the typical
combat soldier. In our application we represent
this knowledge in first-order logic. For example,
(1) Vx has-armour(x) =yes
- prob(veh-type( x) = {tank, APC), 1)
If x has armour, then x is either a tank or an
APC.
(2) Vx has-armour(x) = no
- prob(veh-type(x ) ={truck), 1)
If x has no armour. then x is a truck.
Of course, the amount of commonsense and
environmental knowledge that one chooses to
represent is application specific. What is more
relevant to this discussion is the agent's dynamic
knowledge, or beliefs. about things in the envi-
ronment that are subject to change, such as the
exact location of a vehicle that is in motion.
One way of measuring the success of the belief
simulation model is by studying the performance
of the autonomous agent. As we will see, Ajax is
less likely to be successful at locating, identifying,
and destroying Trojan vehicles when he is acting
upon imperfect information. We can judge the
degree of imperfection by examining Ajax's be-
liefs at some time t during a sample simulation.
In Table 2 we present simulation results showing
that Ajax has incorrectly classified the vehicle
Table 2
A sample of Ajax's beliefs (vehicle 31, range= 4307 meters).
The * denotes incorrect belief
Attribute Actual value Ajax's belief at time t
veh-type tank veh-type(31) = tank
* veh-name Al veh-name(31) = TI
* friend yes friend(31) = no
* location (35843,25290) location(31) = (36080,25390)
* speed 16 speed(31) = 13
under observation. At time t Ajax believes that
Vehicle 31 is a Trojan tank, but at time t + 1 he
may revise that belief based on new data. How-
ever, during the period from t to t + 1, Ajax may
make a grave error (i.e., fratricide) based on his
belief about the vehicle. This is how we achieve
the effect of human error in our autonomous
agent behaviour.
3.3. Factors affecting obsertation
Let us examine how battlefield conditions af-
fect the capability to observe as well as the actual
observation. On a modern battlefield, many things
exist that affect the ability of people to detect and
observe events in the environment. Noise, smoke,
rain, terrain, fatigue, morale, and countless other
factors can impair human performance. Our goal
is to assess the overall impact of these factors so
we can simulate their effect on autonomous agent
performance. For this stage of model develop-
ment, we have chosen five fundamental factors
that, collectively, span a wide range of things that
affect human performance. Other applications of
the model might require many more factors, and
different factors, than the ones we describe here.
The factors for this application are distance, visi-
bility, judgement, knowledge, and equipment. The
first two represent the environmental conditions
0(t) at time t. The last three represent the agent's
apparatus 5 for acquiring and making inferences
about information in the environment.
Distance: Denoted by d, this refers to the
proximity of an event, object, or attribute of an
object, in relation to the observer. The value of d
ranges from 0 to 1: d = I when the event or
object is so close that it can be positively identi-
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fied by an astute observer, under good weather,
and without the aid of any equipment, d = 0
when the object is so far away that there is no
chance it can be detected or identified. The value
is based on the actual distance da from the
observer to the event or object, the distance d(O)
at which d = 0 for that particular event or object,
and the distance d(l) at which d = 1. These val-
ues are combined as follows: If d_ > d(O) then
d = 0; if d_ <d(1) then d = 1; otherwise d is
computed as shown below.
i - d(l) d(O - d( d(O)-______ ) -() ___-(~ l it(d, e [d( I),d(O)]
d = () d() 4110 -1 d d((
- ... tt/ Sd(l)
(5)
The values for d(O) and d( I) are not the same
for all attributes of a battlefield object. For exam-
ple, an observer on a battlefield is more likely to
detect the thermal signature of an approaching
vehicle before judging the vehicle's speed and
name. For each attribute, we determine a range
d(1) at which the attribute may be positively
identified, and a range d(O) at which each at-
tribute is not even detectable. For development
and testing of the observation model, we have
compiled a table of d(O) and d(l) values for
certain vehicle attributes (Table 3). ' Note that as
we go down the list to attributes that are easier to
observe, the observations can be made at greater
distances.
Table 3
Distance (in meters) at which attributes begin to be observed











Visibility: Denoted by v, its value falls be-
tween 0 and 1. This factor encompasses all things
that impact on visibility: time of day, weather,
smoke, dust, and haze. A value of 0 denotes the
poorest possible conditions, such as dense fog or
a moonless night. When t - 1, viewing conditions
are perfect.
Judgement: A value between 0 and 1, j is an
overall measure of the observer's physical and
mental abilities. It refers to the observer's eye-
sight, hearing, alertness, intelligence, morale, and
health. When j= 1, the observer is highly skilled
and makes judgements that are extremely reli-
able. A value of 0 denotes the opposite.
Equipment: Denoted by q, this number is an
overall measure of the utility of all equipment
available to the observer. We refer specifically to
equipment that aids in detection and observation,
such as binoculars, night vision devices, and laser
range finders. The naked eye is denoted by q = 0,
while q = I means that the equipment affords
maximum advantage to the observer.
Knowledge: This value, k, refers to certain
categories of dynamic information that may be
available to the observer. We said in K-B-perfor-
mance that the autonomous agent possesses
knowledge of many aspects of its environment. In
addition to that knowledge, the agent may gain
",privileged" information about its opponents or
its environment. This corresponds to battlefield
intelligence that is gathered and disseminated
among military forces. The value, k, is a single
measure of the value of all knowledge that can
aid an observer or an autonomous agent. When
k = 1, then the agent has perfect knowledge of
that which is under observation or is subject to
detection. In practice, when k = 1, then the agent
"knows everything." When k = 0, then the agent
has no relevant knowledge of the battlefield, other
These rough values are based partly on interviews with
military personnel experienced in range estimation and com-
bat vehicle identification. They are useful for testing this
model. More specific data could be obtained through a rigor-
ous data-collection effort.
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than what is already permanently associated with
the environment.
4. Generating an autonomous agent's beliefs
Having covered the key components of the
model, we can continue with our scenario and
explain how beliefs such as those in Table 2 are
generated. We show how the battlefield factors
are combined into a single probabilistic measure,
m, of the ability of an agent to accurately detect a
given stimulus under a given set of conditions.
For some attributes, we can think of the chosen
value as being sampled from a probability distri-
bution -determined as a function of m -in which
the correct value has a probability m. For other
attributes, m is allowed to influence a reasoning
process that ultimately results in belief selection
for an attribute. This section is in the form of an
overview. We present the functions that are used
to compute m and then discuss how m is applied
to the belief selection process for different classes
of attributes. Finally, we explain how beliefs are
updated, that is, how new observations are recon-
ciled with previous beliefs.
4.1. Observation and belief functions
All five factors mentioned previously can be
directly set, or influenced, by the autonomous
agent programmer or user in order to force the
agent to behave in a prescribed fashion. If these
factors are given low values, then the autonomous
agent will be forced to work with incorrect or
incomplete information most of the time. That is
because all five of the factors combine to deter-
mine m, the overall ability to detect and manipu-
late stimuli. Conversely, if these factors are given
high values, then the agent will have good infor-
mation most of the time and will be very hard for
a human to beat. The formulas that we have
developed and used for computing m(dvJqk)
are given below.
c(d,v,i) = d2 e-A(I -j) ( A = 0.5)
g(c(d,v,i),q) = c + q(l _ C)2-,





Combining these, we get
m( d,v ,j,q,k)
= (d2e-51 'iY + q(l - d2 e-'( 1))) -k
Eq. 6 represents the effect of distance, visibil-
ity and judgement. All of them must be equal to 1
to get perfect ability to observe. As the observer's
judgement deteriorates, the ability to observe de-
cays exponentially. Eq. 7 captures the effect of
equipment. It reduces to Eq. 6 when there is no
useful equipment (q = 0), but otherwise an in-
crease in q improves the ability to observe. Eq. 8
captures the impact of dynamic knowledge, which
can lead to an in-value of 1 on its own. It reduces
Table 4
Ability to observe various attributes for object 31. (k = (1.8, = 1, j (1.9, q =(.5)
Attribute d Actual m Complement I - m
location ().() (35843.25290() .81 n/a 0.19
speed 0.0 16 kph 0.81 n/a 0.19
veh-name (() Al 0.81 (A2, A3, TI, T2, T3} 0.19
veh-type 0(D tank ().8] (truck, APCO 0.19
friend v() yes 0.81 (no) 0.19
armament ((.18 main-gun 0.82 (small-arms, none) 0.18
has-armor (1.35 yes 0.84 (no) 0.16
silhouette (1.46 friendly-shape 0.86 (enemy-shape) 0.14
thermal-sig (1.58 friendly-sig (1.89 (enemy-sig) 0.11
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to Eq. 7 when there is no dynamic knowledge.,
and an increase in k has a positive impact on m.
All of this is consistent with our requirements
and definitions of the factors. It can be verified
easily, by comparing first-and second-order par-
tial derivatives, that the m function has the de-
sired behaviour. In particular, it may be seen that
the function behaves appropriately at each end
point (i.e., by setting each factor to 0 and to 1),
and that the value of m changes in the correct
direction throughout the interval [0,11 as we vary
each factor (by computing the first and second
derivatives). We have also experimentally con-
firmed that these equations exhibit desired be-
haviour. However, we do not argue that these
equations are the only or optimal ones for this
application; rather we claim only that they are
sufficiently useful for our purpose. We illustrate
the use of these functions in the following exam-
ple.
Example 1. Determining ability to observe
Consider an Argive tank located 4037 meters
away from Ajax at time t. This constitutes the
true state, 0(t). The m values in Table 4 reflect
Ajax's ability to detect and manipulate stimuli in
the form of object attributes. The value I - m is
assigned to the complement of the actual value of
each attribute.
Ajax's detections ¢(t) are obtained using the












tribute-Classification that the attributes are clas-
sified according to the types of values they can
have (i.e., continuous or discrete). Fig. 2 depicts
how the m-value changes as we vary distance,
over two different settings for k. In the rest of
this section, we explain how m is used to select
beliefs for each class of attributes.
4.2. Introducing error into observations: A method
for non-discrete cases
We first examine how m is used to select
observations and beliefs about a continuous-val-
ued attribute, location. Observing location in-
volves determining a distance and direction from
the observer (i.e., the agent) to the target. An
error may occur in determining one or both of
these. To model this, we will choose the per-
ceived location from a set of points contained in
the area of a circle, with the true value as its
centre, and a radius that is a function of the m
value. The distance error is computed as a per-
centage of the true distance between the agent
and the target. For example, if the target is 4,037
meters away, and 1 - m = 0.19, then the diameter
is e = 0.19(1000) or 190 meters. Thus, the maxi-
mum range error is e/ 2 = 95 meters.
Next, we select a number at random from the
interval [0, E/2]. This number is the distance
error we introduce into the location belief. We
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apply the distance error in a random direction
from the true target location. In this example, if
the number chosen from the interval is 50, then
we compute (X,Y) coordinates for some point
that is 50 meters in a random direction from the
target. That gives us Ajax's observation about
location of vehicle 31 at time t. If Ajax has no
other information relevant to vehicle 31's loca-
tion, his belief at time t is identical to this obser-
vation. However, when Ajax makes the next ob-
servation at time t + 1, his previous belief must
be considered. We accomplish this by setting
Bel,(t + 1) =p -,(t ± 1) + (1 - p) -Bel,(t)
(9)
where Bel indicates belief, 0 is the observation,
and p is a number between 0 and 1 indicating the
distribution of weight between current observa-
tion and prior belief. This technique allows us to
introduce imperfection in beliefs while maintain-
ing a certain degree of consistency across multi-
ple observations.
The effect of our scheme for computing beliefs
for location can be seen in Fig. 2. This graph
depicts data that was gathered from two separate
runs of the location belief model. In one case, the
knowledge parameter, k, was set to 0.8, while in
the other k = 0.3. For both sets of data, the graph
displays the amount of error, in percentage terms,
in relation to the distance from the agent to the
target. Also shown is the general trend of m
values in relation to distance. First notice that
when the distance is great, m is relatively low.
When m is low, there is a greater chance of
error. This can be seen in the general downward
trend of the data points from left to right, which
corresponds to low m values vs. high values.
Secondly, notice the impact of knowledge on er-
ror. When k = 0.8, the graph is noticeably less
erratic than when k = 0.3. Intuitively, this corre-
sponds to the notion that a more knowledgeable
observer, one with better information, will be
somewhat more consistent over the long term.
4.3. Combining multiple pieces of evidence
Next we examine belief generation for at-
tributes whose values may be inferred from val-
Goal: veh-name is in {T1,T2}
Conditions:
1. veh-type is in {tank, APC}
Subconditions:
a. armament is in {main-gun, small-arms}
b. has-armor = yes
2. friend = no
Subconditions:
a. silhouette = enemy-shape
b. thermal-sig = enemy-sig
Fig. 3. Decision-making criteria for Ajax
ues of other attributes. These are the discrete-
valued attributes covered in Attribute-Classifica-
tion. We will employ a reasoning system to infer
values of these attributes since the enumerated
values of these attributes are not suitable for the
kind of approach discussed in the previous sec-
tion. For instance, if an attribute is associated
with a set of three allowable values, how does one
directly introduce a five percent error? Further-
more, a logical approach exploits ways in which
these attributes are related to each other.
Recall that Ajax's mission is to identify and
destroy all Trojan combat vehicles. We say that in
order to identify a vehicle, its attribute veh-name
must be determined. Furthermore, since Ajax
only wants to destroy combat vehicles, he must
determine that the vehicle name is in the set
{TIT2}. The conditions and preconditions neces-
sary for Ajax to do this are summarized in Fig. 3.
Note that these conditions and preconditions re-
fer to other discrete-valued attributes. In the
reasoning methods that we introduce in this sec-
tion and expand upon in Comparison we use
these relationships to arrive at "logically correct"
belief values for the discrete-valued attributes.
4.4. Resolving new beliefs with past beliefs
As in the non-discrete case, once tentative
beliefs and conclusions have been determined
using the methods above, we must consider the
agent's previous beliefs before making a final
selection. The simplest case is the first observa-
tion at time t(, where there are no prior beliefs.
In this case, the agent's belief is the same as the
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current tentative observations or conclusions. In
the next case, prior beliefs exist but they do not
contradict the latest observation. In this case the
equation for the simplest case holds. In the gen-
eral case, however, the observations F(t + 1) are
contradicted by B(t). The ways in which we han-
dle this are different for the two approaches.
They will be illustrated in the following section.
5. A comparison of numerical and logical ap-
proaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in belief
simulation
To illustrate a logical approach and a numeri-
cal approach for choosing appropriate beliefs for
an agent, we will continue with our example and
show how a vehicle identification belief would be
chosen under each method. We will calculate
beliefs for a single point in time at a distance of
4037 meters. The values in Table 4 will be used
for both examples. Following the step-by-step il-
lustration, we will discuss the results of several
simulations that were conducted for the purpose
of assessing the utility of each approach. We will
explain what we feel are the desired characteris-
tics in a model such as this, and then show, using
data from the simulations, how we evaluated the
two approaches against these characteristics.
Recall that a vehicle identification consists of
the attribute veh-name, which is determined by
veh-type and friend. These, in turn, are deter-
mined by other attributes, as laid out in Fig. 3.
We will follow this strategy in our examples.
5.1. Employing a numerical technique for choosing
beliefs
In our first approach, the numerical one, we
employ the Dempster-Shafer rule of evidence
combination Shafer, 1976, Gordon, Shortliffe,
1984. This involves computing a numerical value
to determine the degree of support, or evidence,
provided by one attribute value for another, and
then combining and normalizing these values in
order to arrive at a figure that captures the net
impact of all relevant evidence. Furthermore, we
distinguish between two kinds of evidence: that
provided by direct observation (aP(t) of Frame-
work, Eq. 1) -when a sensory device is used to
detect the attribute -and that provided by indi-
rection observation (P(t), Eq. 2), which applies to
information gained through a combination of in-
ference and detection. The agent's knowledge
base A provides the necessary rules for comput-
ing evidence values for indirect observations us-
ing m (from Table 4), and Eqs. 2 and 3 presented
in Framework. These computations, along with
the remaining steps of this procedure, are ex-
plained below.
(1) Determine evidence, fkveh-type(t) and kfriend(t),
from direct observation of veh-type and
friend, respectively. We have m-values of 0.81
for both attributes. We interpret them as
partial evidence (0.81) for the correct values
of tank and yes, and partial evidence (0.19)
for their complements. A sample of this is
shown as ml in Table 5. This table illustrates
computations only for veh-type; however,
Table 5
Sources of evidence for the vehicle type of Object 31
Evidence
m,(veh-type(31) = (tank)) = 0.81
m,(veh-type(31) = (truck, APC)) = 0.19
m2(veh-type(31) = (tank, APCI) = 0.84
m2 (veh-type(31) = {truck)) = 0.16
m3(veh-type(30) = (tank)) = 0.82
m3 (veh-type(31) = {truck, APC)) = 0.18
Source
direct observation (m)
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Table 6
Combining inm and m, (ml o in,)
m,[tank.APC1 = 0.84 m,{truck} = 0.16 m m,(0) = 0.13 K =I ml-M M2(}) = 0.87
m1{tank} 0.81 {tank} 0.68 10.13 mI EDim({tankl) = (0.68/K) = 0.78
mI 0 im 2((truck}) = (0.03/K) = 0.04
mi1{truck.APC ().19 {APC} ().t6 {truck) 0.03 m1 + m,((APC1) = (0.16/K) = 0.18
those for friend would be performed in the
same manner. The general rule for doing this
computation is simple. For any attribute a
and object x, if the true value of a(x) is -q
and if the m value for a is p. then there is
evidence p indicating that a(x) equals T7, and
evidence I -p indicating the complement of
(171.
(2) Determine evidence 0,h-tpe(t) and OffiCnd(t)
for the two attributes that can be inferred
using Ajax's knowledge base .J and other
observations in ¢(t). For example, consider
the effect of an observation about armour: we
know (in(has-armour(3 l)) = ().84). We also
know (from Rules I and 2) that if a vehicle x
has armour, then it must be a tank or an APC
(probability 1), and that if x does not have
armour it must be a truck. Thus, we can
logically infer additional evidence mi about
vehicle type: 0.84 (multiplying (1.84 and 1) for
tank or APC, and 0.16 for truck. Similarly.
the values for mi3 are obtained using the
"armament" rule. These inferences about the
value of vehicle type constitute Ovehlvpe(t) in
this example. The same procedure would ap-
ply to friend using evidence from the
"silhouette" and '"thermal-sig" rules. In gen-
eral, these inferences are made (recall Eq. 2)
by combining the agent's knowledge base with
current direct observations, and using the fol-
lowing additional rule of inference. Suppose
that we have m(a(x)) = p, and that the agent's
knowledge base contains a statement of the
form (a(x) = 7i) -(prob(o,qi)) for some
value (set of values) ai,. From this we first
compute, as in step 1 above, the evidence pi
for the value zij. Then, combining this value
with the antecedent of the statement, we can
infer evidence pi 'q for the statement 0. We
compute all such conclusions that logically
follow from a(x).
(3) Combine the individual evidences. In general,
independent observations and inferences
could lead to multiple, possibly contradictory,
values for an attribute. For example, accord-
ing to our knowledge base, "has-armour(x) =
no" and "armament(x) = main-gun" are con-
tradictory, since the presence of a main gun
indicates a tank, while the absence of armour
indicates a truck. Therefore, a method for
reasoning about multiple, and possibly con-
tradictory, pieces of evidence is required. Re-
call that such a method constitutes our set of
rules y (see Eq. 3). Under our numerical
approach, we have the Dempster-Shafer
method Gordon, Shortliffe, 1984, Shafer, 1976
for this purpose. This results in the following
computations.
Table 7
Combining mI2 and Mn ('i 12 e MI)
m (tank) = ().82' m3{truckAPCI} = 0.18 min2 iM3(0) = 0.32 K =I - i 1 2 'M 3 (0) = 0.68
m 2{tankl 0.78 {tank) (0.68 ( 0.14 mIl, e mi(6tank)) = (0.64/K) = 0.94
m12{APCI 0.18 O 0.15 {APC1 0.03 m 1 2 0 mi3({APCI) = (0.03/K) = 0.04
m2 {truckl 0.04 ()0.0)3 (truck) 0.01 M1 2 e Mi3 (truck)) = (O.I1/K) = 0.02
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(a) Combine m, with m2 as shown for at-
tribute veh-type in the tableau in Table 6.
Notice that, as we "add" the effect of m.
to m,, the probability of correctly observ-
ing veh-type decreases from 0.81 to 0.78.
Now we go on to add the effect of the
armament rule. For conciseness of nota-
tion let us denote m, e m, by ml,.
(b) Combine m, Ed m, with m3 as shown in
Table 7. Now the probability of observing
a tank is 0.94, considerably higher than it
was without considering additional evi-
dence.
(4) Make random selection and assert observa-
tion. We have three possibilities for veh-type:
tank (0.94), APC (0.04) and truck (0.02). We
choose a random number v from a uniform
distribution (1 to 1(10), and determine Ajax's
observation as follows:
(a) If 1 •y < 94, then veh-type(31) = tank
(b) If 94 <y < 98, then veh-type(31) = APC
(c) If 98 <y < 100, then veh-type(31) = truck
In this example, the first statement above was
satisfied and the corresponding observation
was asserted. If a number between 95 and 100
had been generated, Ajax would have ended
up with an incorrect observation about vehi-
cle type. The same procedure was applied to
attribute friend with the results: yes (0.06)
and no (0.96). When we made a random
selection we chose "no." With these two
pieces of information we can now deduce a
value for the attribute veh-name. Since "tank"
is denoted by a 1, and the enemy is denoted
by "T," the corresponding vehicle name is
TI.
(5) Compare current observation with previous
belief. It so happens that this observation
does not agree with our belief at time t - 1.
We make a choice by once again combining
evidence values in an intersection tableau,
using current observations and previous be-
liefs as sources of evidence. It is only neces-
sary to reconcile those attributes that are
different. In this example, the attributes ar-
mament, ueh-type and veh-name were differ-
ent at time t - 1, due to the effects of ran-
dom selection. At t - 1, armament = small-
arms, veh-type = APC, and veh-name = T2.
When we recombine these in a tableau, we
use as supporting values all current observa-
tions that pertain to these attributes. For
example, we will gather current evidence sup-
porting armament = small-arms, and current
evidence supporting armament = main-gun.
In this example, we chose veh-type = tank,
armament = main-gun and veh-name = T2 as
final values.
(6) Transmit final belief to the agent's "decision
maker." The actual work of the belief simula-
tion model is complete at the previous step.
However, we mention this final step as a
reminder of the purpose of this effort. We
want to communicate our results to the agent's
interpretation processes (see Framework). In
this case, due to the effects of random selec-
tion, the value T2 for vehicle name is not
consistent with the other attribute values that
describe the object, since T2 denotes a Trojan
APC while armament = main-gun implies a
tank. We impose no requirement for consis-
tency among the attribute values of an object.
It is up to the interpretative processes to
make the best of this "faulty" input data.
However, we also recognize that this may vary
from one implementation to another. For ex-
ample, another approach in this final step
would be to assert an incorrect value for the
attribute veh-name, which would have the
effect of incorrectly identifying the vehicle,
but then adjust the remaining discrete-valued
attributes so that they are consistent with
'eh-name. This would allow the agent's deci-
sion-making and planning processes to be
greatly simplified.
In this example we have demonstrated a nu-
merical approach to choosing beliefs for an agent.
We calculated current observations based on evi-
dence combination and then combined observa-
tions with previous beliefs to determine our final
beliefs. We then considered some issues pertain-
ing to the actual contents of the belief message
that is transmitted.
We showed how evidence combination was
used to determine observations about veh-type
and friend. In our implementation, we adopt a
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strategy that minimizes computation time by cal-
culating only those attribute observations that are
necessary to identify the vehicle (i.e., determine
its veh-name). However, other implementations
may perform the evidence combination steps for
all attributes in order to obtain the most thor-
ough overall observation and subsequent belief.
This is a valid use of the model. The approach
taken should be governed by the purpose of the
application.
5.2. Employing a defeasible reasoning technique for
choosing beliefs
Now we will step through exactly the same
vehicle identification problem that we used for
the numerical approach, only this time we will
attempt to logically infer what the belief values
should be. Although we are calling this the "logi-
cal" approach, we are not abandoning random
selection altogether. Recall our overall frame-
work from Framework: detection, measurement
and interpretation. We said that the belief simu-
lation model simulates detection and measure-
ment functions for the agent. We also pointed
out how errors can occur in the detection process
though faulty sensing or noise in the environ-
ment, and that those errors may adversely affect
measurement and interpretation. In the logical
approach to choosing beliefs, we employ random
selection at the detection level to simulate the
overall effect of both faulty sensing and noise.
We then make logical inferences using these po-
tentially faulty detection values.
In our simulation of the agent's measurement
processes, we try to make the best inference that
we can, given the detection values that are re-
ceived. Following the technique of defeasible rea-
soning Nute, 1992, the rule base we use for this
purpose contains a mixture of three kinds of
rules: absolute rules, denoted by -A; defeasible
rules, denoted by A-; and defeaters, denoted by
-A. Traditional rule bases contain only absolute
rules that are consistent with each other and with
factual statements in the knowledge base. New
assertions that cannot be logically supported are
rejected. Defeasible rules, on the other hand,
have antecedents that can be defeated in special
cases. The special cases are called defeaters. The
application of a defeasible rule may also be
blocked by conflicting defeasible rules. This kind
of reasoning system permits one to reason with
such notions as "maybe," "usually," "typically,"
(in contrast to the universal quantification in
standard logic) and so on, and is a form of
nonmonotonic reasoning. There are other ap-
proaches to this style of reasoning that are sum-
marized succinctly in Brewka, 1991.
The rule base that we will refer to in this
section is essentially a restatement of the agent's
primary knowledge base A. We have dropped the
measures of probability in the consequents of the
rules and restated many of them as defeasible
rules. For example, the original rule
(Vx has - armour(x) = no)
- ( prob(veh - type(x) = {truck},1))
is replaced by the defeasible rule (since there
might be vehicles, other than trucks, without ar-
mour)
(Vx -lhas - armour(x)) (truck(x))
and
(Vx armament(x) = small - arms)
-s ( prob(veh - type(x) = {tank,APC},1))
is replaced by the defeasible rule
(Vxsmall - arms(x)) => (tank(x) V APC(x))
Since the rule base now contains a mixture of
absolute and defeasible rules, the logical paths of
inference can be said to have "strict" and "non-
strict" links Nute, 1992. The links connect nodes,
and each node represents an attribute value, such
as (veh-type = tank). Also note that the an-
tecedents of the rules are themselves attributes of
the object under consideration and thus have m
values associated with them. These characteristics
of our rule base are used to form meta-level
strategies for reconciling conflicting detection val-
ues.
(1) The Strictness Rule. If two or more paths
compete, and one path has the fewest non-
strict links, then that path is superior.
(2) The Reliability Rule. If two or more compet-
ing paths have the same number of strict and
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non-strict links, and one path has a node with
the highest m value, then that path is supe-
rior. This rule is based on our interpretation
of m, namely, as a measure of the likelihood
of correctly identifying an attribute.
(3) The Persistence Rule. If two or more compet-
ing paths have the same number of strict and
non-strict links, and no path has a node with
the highest m value, then a decision may be
postponed until an attribute value has oc-
curred n times in n decision cycles. When
that occurs, the path containing that value is
the superior path. This is analogous to a
"wait and see" approach. The agent's inter-
pretation processes will receive no informa-
tion until the conflict is resolved. The amount
of time that this can continue is influenced by
n, which is user-settable. It is also influenced
by the random selection of detection values at
the start of each decision cycle. This strategy
may be abandoned if, while waiting for the
necessary conditions to be satisfied, another
strategy can be applied successfully.
One result of applying these strategies is that
the reasoning system is now equipped to handle
cases for which no prior knowledge or rules ex-
isted. For example, suppose the agent encounters
a truck that is armed with machine-guns. In the
original rule base this assertion would be rejected
because only tanks and APCs have weapons. It
could also be rejected because a truck is not an
armoured vehicle, while tanks and APCs (which
carry weapons) have armour. In the defeasible
rule base, however, if the m value for armament
= machine-gun is equal to the m value for has-
armour = none, and the paths containing those
nodes have equal numbers of strict and non-strict
links, then Rule 3, above, will apply and the
model will take a "wait and see" approach. If
those same attribute values occur n times, then
the model will modify its world knowledge base
to include the fact that trucks may be armed (and
presumably dangerous).
Now that we have given an overview of our
defeasible logic approach, we can proceed with
the vehicle identification example outlined at the
beginning of this section.
(1) Calculate m for the attributes armament,
has-armour, silhouette, and thermal-sig. Select
a detection value for each attribute from the
respective sets of possible values (i.e., {main-
gun, small-arms, none) for armament). Allow
a weight of m for the true value, and 1 - m
distributed evenly among the remaining val-
ues. (Note: This is implementation-specific;
I - m may be distributed according to other
rules.)
(2) Assert the resulting attribute detections. For
this example we assert
silhouette = friendly-shape (m = 0.86)
thermal-sig = enemy-sig (m = 0.89)
armament = main = gun (m = 0.82)
has-armour = yes (m = 0.82)
(3) Deduce values for the attributes ueh-type,
friend, and veh-name. The last of the three is,
of course, what we wish to determine. Note
that we have a problem inferring whether the
vehicle is friend or foe, based on the informa-
tion provided. When we apply the first meta-
rule, we discover that the paths containing
these nodes have the same numbers of strict
and non-strict links, so that rule doesn't re-
solve the conflict. However, the attribute
thermal-sig has a higher m value, which satis-
fied Rule 2 and allows us to assert friend = no.
Finally we can assert veh-name = TI. The
resulting set of attribute values becomes our
current observation.
(4) Reconcile current observations with previous
beliefs. We compare the attribute observa-
tions at time t with beliefs at time t - I to
determine which attribute values, if any, are
different. In this example, we found that at
time t - 1, friend = yes and veh-name = Al.
This means that the vehicle we previously
believed to be a friendly tank is now appear-
ing to be an enemy tank. To resolve this we
employ a backtracking procedure to deter-
mine whether or not the previous beliefs can
be logically supported under the current con-
ditions. If necessary, the backtracking proce-
dure may invoke the meta-rules to resolve an
impasse. At some point, the previous belief
will be accepted or rejected. If it is rejected,
then the choice is easy: we assert the current
observation as the current belief and move to
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the next step. (Even though several decision
cycles may have passed if, during the back-
tracking phase. Rule 3 was invoked and the
model went into its "wait and see" mode.)
The situation is more complicated in the case
when a previous belief is accepted and it
contradicts the current observation. Intu-
itively, we might think that this could not
happen. However, the defeasible structure of
our rules and meta-rules permits such conclu-
sions. After all, our current observations in-
clude the assertion that friend = no, even
though we have the detection silhouette =
friendly-shape. To resolve this situation we
invoke a variant of the Persistence Rule:
(a) The Persistence Rule for Belief Selection.
When a previous belief about an attribute
and a current observation of the same
attribute are contradictory, and both val-
ues are supported by the current condi-
tions, and one attribute value occurs nb
times in nh decision cycles, then that value
may be asserted as the current belief.
The variable nb is chosen to distinguish it
from n in the original Persistence Rule. This
is a user-settable value that will influence
whether the agent places more emphasis on
current observations as opposed to previous
beliefs. Future research may reveal better so-
lutions for this particular detail. However,
other solutions that we considered involved
many more rules and preconditions that had
to be satisfied. In our implementation we
focused on the real-time nature of the appli-
cation and opted for a straightforward solu-
tion in order to avoid excessive rule-firing. In
this particular example, the previous belief
was not supported by the current conditions
and we were able to assert the current obser-
vation as the new belief.
(5) Transmit belief message to "decision-maker."
As with the previous example, this step is not
part of the model per se. Including it permits
us to make the same point we made earlier.
that the belief message that is ultimately
transmitted may contain attribute values that
are inconsistent. On the other hand, the dis-
crete-valued attributes may be adjusted to
match the value of the attribute veh-name if
the particular implementation requires it. We
opt to transmit the message "as is."
This concludes our step-by-step discussion of
two approaches to belief simulation: one involv-
ing a numerical method for handling uncertainty,
and the other involving defeasible logic tech-
niques for making belief selection. This preceding
discussion was for the purpose of illustrating the
mechanics of the two methods. We made no
attempt to compare or evaluate the contrasting
approaches. In the next section we present some
results from simulations of the two methods and
a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses that
we were able to ascertain.
5.3. Strengths and weaknesses of the two ap-
proaches
We originally implemented the belief simula-
tion model in a combat simulation system involv-
ing autonomous forces operating in a virtual envi-
ronment portrayed on computer screens Branley,
1992. Consequently, we were able to collect data
on the behaviour of our original model and on
the overall performance of the agents receiving
belief messages from the model. In presenting
the research at hand, we focus our attention on
comparing the behaviour of the two methods we
have presented for selecting beliefs about dis-
crete-valued attributes of objects. Therefore, we
will present results pertaining strictly to that com-
parison and not to the overall performance of the
agent.
Before discussing the simulations, we must
state what we were looking for in terms of a
performance measure and how we obtained that
measure. Recall that the whole purpose of this
model is to introduce imperfections into the be-
liefs of the autonomous agent. Our intent is that
the degree of imperfection be governed, over
time, by the value m which is a probabilistic
measure of how accurately the agent is able to
make observations under the given conditions. A
frequentist interpretation of this probability is
that if the agent were to make the observation
many times, a fraction m of those observations
would be accurate. This view enables us to design
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the following kind of test for our model: we hold
the input values constant and then, for a given
number of trials, count the number of times that
the belief values match the input values. We can
say that a trial is successful if the output matches
the input. If we divide the number of successes by
the number of trials, we should, theoretically,
obtain a number close to m.
There are two ways we can describe a trial as
successful. We can say that the trial resulted in a
perfect match if all of the input values match all
of the output values (i.e., all of the object at-
tributes match). We can say that a trial results in
a substantial match if the attribute t'eh-name
matches in both sets of values. This would mean
that the object has been correctly identified, which
might be all that is required in some implementa-
tions. 4 Both interpretations of success are valid.
so we will present both calculations in our discus-
sions. Finally, the difference in the two matches
(the perfect match will have a lower value, by
definition) may be of interest since it indicates
how often ceh-name was identified correctly while
other attributes were not; in other words it shows
that there was a conflict between the values of all
attributes.
Up to this point we have not considered an
overall m value; we have computed m for each
attribute; we obtained different numbers due to
the effects of the distance factor, d. For the
purposes of evaluating the models we must be
clear about which m value we are using. When
computing substantial matches as described
above, we can use the m value for the attribute
t'eh-name as an adequate performance measure.
When evaluating perfect matches we must com-
pute a special, overall, m value that reflects the
probability of correctly identifying all of the ob-
ject attributes. For now we will define an overall
m as the average of the individual attribute m
values.
Having presented our methodology, we can
4 The choice of L eh-,lame as this distinguished attribute is
appropriate for the purpose of our test since ueeh-namne may
be directly observer, but is also inferred through various other
attributes via decision rules.
Table 8
Input to the simulations:
object
















now describe the simulations and the results. We
ran both models through two versions of a simu-
lation. In version 1, the agent is located at a point
(0,0) and the target object is located at (2000,2000)
in a two-dimensional plane. The distance be-
tween the two points is 2828. Table 8 shows the
true attribute values of the target, and Table 9
shows the values for four of the factors that affect
observation (see Factors). Recall that the dis-
tance factor may vary with each attribute. We
held the target at a fixed location, thus keeping
all variables constant, and ran both belief models
through 200 trials. We ran two sets of trials under
version 1: a) with the target at (2000,2000), and b)
with the target held fixed further away from the
agent at (5000,5000).
Table 10 depicts the results of this simulation.
We see in Version la of the simulation that both
models had a percentage of substantial (i.e., veh-
Table Ii
Version I simulation results: target is at (2000. 2000)
Model Overall m Perfect veh-name m Substantial
matches matches
Numerical 0.895 0.725 0.871 0.985
Logical 0.895 0.935 0.871 0.955
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Table 11
Version I simulation results: target is at (5000, 5000)
Model Overall m Perfect veh-name m Substantial
matches matches
Numerical 0.858 0).495 0.858 0.975
Logical 0.858 0.715 0.858 0.765
name) matches that was above the m-value for
veh-name. The values indicate that it is highly
likely that the agent would have concluded (with
qualifications) that the object under observation
was a valid target. Depending on the nature of its
interpretation processes, it might have destroyed
the target object very early in the simulation. This
may or may not be what the application devel-
oper intends. Next, note the difference between
substantial matches and perfect matches. For the
logical model, the difference is small; this corre-
sponds to the logically consistent nature of the
model. For the numerical model, however, the
difference is very large. Certain attributes were
identified incorrectly; the result of those mis-
identifications was to pull down the strength of
belief in veh-name (since the value of these at-
tributes were interpreted as additional evidence
for veh-name) but not sufficiently enough to re-
verse the conclusion. This accounts for the large
difference in perfect matches between the two
models. In the logical case, the defeasible rule
structure was able to overcome "noise" in the
form of randomized error in the detection values
in order to correctly deduce the exact identity of
the object. In the numerical case, evidence values
that supported opposing conclusions had a
'voice" due to the evidence combination process.
Then, randomization at the end of the process
did not always work in favour of the true values.
Having noted these facts, consider what hap-
pens when we run the same simulation at a
greater distance, version lb. In Table 11. the
target object is at P(5000,5000) while the agent
remains at P(0K0).
Now we see the effects of increased range on
the belief simulation process. In the numerical
case, evidence combination produces a consis-
tently high percentage of substantial matches,
which would lead to the agent destroying the
target quickly (depending on how its interpreta-
tive processes operate). This is because even a
small evidence value can influence the process.
However, because of noise in the sensory read-
ings, due to greater distance, the numerical
model's percentage of perfect matches dropped
significantly. In the logical case, the percentage of
both perfect and substantial matches dropped far
below their previous readings, but remained rela-
tively close together. The difference between sub-
stantial matches for the two models was as be-
fore, only a bit more pronounced for the numeri-
cal model. After studying the results of many
simulations, we notice that the logical model ap-
pears to be more internally consistent and more
stable, rising and falling rather consistently as m
rises and falls.
In the second simulation we used the same
attribute values for the target, but gave the target
an initial location of P(4000,4000) and decre-
mented the x and y coordinates by a value of 200
at regular intervals, thus moving the target in a
straight line toward the agent, which was fixed at
P(O,0). Four of the observation factors were held
to the same values as before, but the fifth, dis-
Table 12
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Table 13
Version 2 simulation statistics: moving target
Model Overall m Perfect veh-name m Substantial
(average) matches (average) matches
Numerical 0.91 0.7 0.895 0.85
Logical 0.91 0.9 ).895 ().9
tance, changed as the target moved closer to the
agent, thus the m values changed. At each "stop-
ping point," or decision cycle, we calculated a set
of agent beliefs. We did this 20 times to show, on
average, how the models reacted to moving tar-
gets. This corresponds to the way in which these
models would be used in practice, except that the
target object would move in much smaller incre-
ments and beliefs would be computed more of-
ten. In Table 12 we have provided the actual
distance figures and m values for this simulation.
as well as the summarized information in Table
13.
As in Version 1 of the simulation, we see in
Version 2 the trend that the perfect and substan-
tial matches in the logical case are close together
(in this case, the same) while those same percent-
ages for the numerical model are farther apart.
This provides additional support for our observa-
tion that the logical model appears to be more
stable and it also appears to rise and fall consis-
tently with m.
6. Conclusion
We have described a general framework, and
presented two methods. for implementing an au-
tonomous agent belief simulation system. Our
framework for agent reasoning explicitly sepa-
rates the agent's decision-making processes from
the information-gathering ones. In the absence of
any sensors to gather information, we introduce a
probabilistic observation model which acts as the
agent's interface to collect information from the
outside world. We combine these external obser-
vations with what the agent already knows, or
believes, in order to form the agent's new beliefs.
In doing so, the agent is often faced with multi-
ple, and often conflicting, pieces of related evi-
dence. For reasoning with these evidences, we
presented a numerical approach, based upon the
Dempster-Shafer evidence combination algo-
rithm, and a logical approach, based upon defea-
sible reasoning. We presented details of the im-
plementation of the two approaches and then
discussed results of several simulations that we
conducted in order to evaluate the models.
Our conclusion thus far in this research is that
the logical approach has certain behavioral char-
acteristics that make it more stable, and thus
more predictable. As we pointed out in the previ-
ous section, the frequency with which the agent
had correct information using the logical ap-
proach tended to rise and fall with the indicator,
in. This is the desired behaviour. This result is
partly due to where the randomization is in-
serted. In the logical method it is applied at the
beginning of a decision cycle, after which the
agent's rules have a chance to reason correctly in
spite of noisy input. In the numerical approach,
randomization is used in the selection of weighted
options, which leaves open the possibility of in-
correct beliefs being chosen in spite of evidence
to the contrary. Which method is more desirable
depends, to a large extent, on the reasoning capa-
bilities of the autonomous agent for whom the
beliefs are being generated. For example, if the
agent could reason with belief intervals, the
Dempster Shafer method (sans the step in which
we randomly generated a point belief from the
interval) would be desirable.
Many more issues can be addressed in this
area. For example, we have not addressed how
the agent's beliefs are influenced by other agents.
Nor have we addressed the important role that
perception undoubtedly plays in the formation of
beliefs. In addition to these research directions,
there are many potential applications for this
kind of model. Besides the case of using a simula-
tor to train soldiers, one could conduct a simula-
tion of a conflict by having two teams, or forces,
of autonomous agents oppose each other. In this
type of study, it would be essential for the agents
to be acting upon beliefs that are influenced by
environmental conditions and each agent's own
(simulated) capabilities. In simulations of other
settings, such as economies and societies, groups
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of agents that interact freely. but which are con-
strained by imperfect beliefs, may greatly en-
hance the decision-making value of the simula-
tion.
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